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Abstract 
Previous research has indicated a developmental tendency 
toward greater repetition choice and recall of interrupted 
tasks than for completed tasks. The present study inves-
tigated this relationship and the possibility that observing 
versus performing a task might have differential effects on 
recall and repetition choice. Thirteen ten year old and 
eleven thirteen year old boys (performers) individually 
assembled eighteen jig-saw puzzles of birds and animals. 
Twenty-four peers of the same age (observers) observed 
puzzle assembly. Contrary to previous research, no signi-
ficant tendency was found for older participants to recall 
and to choose to repeat more interrupted tasks than for 
younger participants. However, observers revealed a signi-
ficantly greater tendency than performers to choose to repeat 
interrupted tasks. No comparable difference was apparent 
for recall scores. These results are discussed in the 
context of numerous problems apparent in previous research. 
Implications for future research using the interrupted task 
paradigm are also considered. 
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The interrupted task paradigm, as it is typically 
used in psychological research, involves the study of 
individuals who are engaged in a number of activities. 
The individuals are allowed to complete some of the 
tasks and others are interrupted before completion. 
Zeigarnik (193^) introduced the interrupted task 
paradigm as a test of the prediction (based on the 
Lewinian theory of motivation) that interrupted tasks 
would be recalled more frequently than completed tasks. 
She explained her subsequent finding that incompleted 
tasks were recalled more frequently than completed tasks 
in terms of the psychical difference between them existing 
at the moment of recall. Each task which was attempted 
was said to set up a quasi-need or tension within the 
individual for completion of the task. This tension 
was discharged when the task was completedj however, it 
remained intact if the task were interrupted before com-
pletion. When the experimenter instructed the individual 
to recall the tasks a quasi-need to recall all of the 
tasks developed. Hence, at the moment of recall two 
tension systems were operative, the first directed toward 
the recall of all the tasks, the second directed toward 
the recall of the interrupted tasks. Therefore, the 
strength of the tension favouring recall of the interrupted 
tasks was said to depend upon the relative strength of the 
two tension systems. 
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According to Lewinian theory, a tendency to resume 
an interrupted task and a tendency to recall it are expressions 
of the same tension system (Lewin, 1951)* Hence, some 
researchers have studied behaviour in the interrupted task 
paradigm by having an individual choose which of two tasks, 
one which has been completed and one which has been interrupted, 
he wishes to complete. 
The interrupted task paradigm has been of interest to 
numerous psychologists since it was first utilized by Zeigamik 
in 1927. It has assumed wide theoretical significance, having 
been used to test the psychoanalytic theory of repression 
(Rosenzweig, 1938), the achievement-motive conceptions of 
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953), a mediation-
avoidance hypothesis of personality functioning (Inglis, 1961), 
and a developmental theory of success-failure conceptualization 
(Cromwell, 1963). Since the achievement-motive theory and the 
mediation-avoidance hypothesis do not apply to the present 
research, they will not be discussed. However, the develop-
mental theory of success-failure conceptualization and the 
psychoanalytic theory of repression will be discussed in the 
following sections of this paper. 
Chronological Age, Mental Age, and Repetition Choices 
A large number of interrupted task studies have con-
cerned the effects of chronological age and mental age on 
repetition choices. In 1933 Rosenzweig undertook a study 
1. Zeigamik's experiment was conducted and published in 
Germany and was later reported by her in English in 1938. 
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with 37 crippled, institutionalized children of both sexes 
whose chronological ages ranged from five years six months 
to fourteen years eight months and whose mental ages ranged 
from four years two months to twelve years two months. Two 
five-piece puzzles were used as the experimental tasks and 
the amount of time spent on the puzzles ranged from fifteen 
seconds to sixteen minutes and thirty seconds. 
Each child was told that he would be given some puzzles 
to see if he could do them as well as the other children and 
that if he did not finish on time he would be stopped. Each 
child worked on two puzzles, one which was completed and one 
which was interrupted before completion. No mention was made 
of the criterion for interruption. An attempt was made to 
counterbalance the order of presentation of the two puzzles. 
In twenty of the 37 cases Puzzle A was presented before Puzzle 
Bj in seventeen cases, Puzzle B preceded Puzzle A. In eighteen 
cases the first puzzle was completed while the second was 
interrupted! in nineteen cases the first puzzle was interrupted 
while the second was completed. Timing was made obvious so as 
to arouse the participants. 
After the second puzzle was completed the child was asked 
which puzzle he wished to repeat. Of the 37 children, twenty 
preferred the completed puzzle while seventeen preferred to 
repeat the interrupted puzzle. The median chronological age 
of all children who preferred to repeat the completed puzzle 
was eight years and of the children who preferred to repeat 
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the interrupted puzzle was eleven years, two months. When 
Yule's coefficient of association for the relationship 
between chronological age (below or above the median age 
for the whole group) and preference to repeat the interrupted 
or completed puzzle was calculated, the coefficient was 
found to be .80. 
When mental ages (measured by the Kuhlman-Anderson tests 
for intelligence) were considered, Rosenzweig found a highly 
significant covariation of mental age and repetition preference 
for the interrupted task. This relationship was reported to 
appear more marked than that between repetition preference and 
chronological age, since Yule's coefficient of association for 
the former was .80 and for the latter was .95. (No significance 
tests were mentioned.) 
However, there are several possible flaws in this study. 
Rosenzweig admits that subjects may have been biased by the 
question, "Which puzzle did you like better, the first one or 
the second one?" since it was sometimes asked before repetition 
choices were made. Having the children dwell on which puzzle 
they liked better may have caused them to choose this puzzle 
rather than the one they might otherwise have chosen. Rosenzweig 
also mentions the fact that the puzzles were not equally diffi-
cult for all children tested. Furthermore, one choice was used 
as a measure of repetition preference. More choices 
between pairs of completed and interrupted puzzles would 
probably have been a more reliable measure. In this study 
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varying amounts of time were spent on the puzzles. Time taken 
for puzzle assembly may have been important in determining 
which puzzles the children chose to repeat. It is possible 
that puzzles which took longer to assemble became more meaningful 
to the participant and were, therefore, more frequently chosen 
for repetition. 
Rosenzweig (19^5) undertook a further series of studies, 
including normal children, problem children, mentally deficient 
children and normal adults. Seventy normal children ranging 
in age from four years three months to fourteen years four 
months were individually given two five-piece jig-saw puzzles 
to solve competitively. Completion was allowed on one puzzle 
but not on the other. No mention was made of the criterion for 
interruption. Puzzle pieces were deliberately arranged, when 
presented, so as to vary roughly in difficulty of solution 
according to the age and ability of the child. Order of 
presentation of the two puzzles and of completion and inter-
ruption were counterbalanced. The results substantiated those 
of the previous study, for both chronological age and mental 
age were positively related to the tendency to repeat the 
interrupted puzzle. 
With ten problem children, ranging in chronological age 
from five years six months to fourteen years, chronological 
age was again positively related to repetition choice of the 
interrupted task. Rosenzweig reported that the mean age of 
the six participants who chose the completed puzzle was eight 
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years one month while the mean age of those who chose the 
interrupted puzzle was twelve years five months. The relation-
ship between mental age and repetition choice was not tested. 
With twelve mentally deficient children whose chronological 
ages ranged from fifteen years six months to sixteen years five 
months and whose mental ages ranged from four years eight months 
to ning years two months, mental age was found to be positively 
related to repetition choice of the interrupted task. The 
mean mental age of the group of children choosing the completed 
puzzle was six years nine months while the mean mental age of 
the group choosing the interrupted puzzle was eight years. No 
statistical tests of relationships between chronological age, 
mental age, and repetition choice were reported. 
Repetition choices of eight undergraduates of Harvard 
University were studied using the same procedure, except that 
the two puzzles employed were of greater difficulty and were 
presented as an intelligence test. In every case immediate 
choice of the interrupted puzzle was made. 
Rosenzweig concluded that the results of this study, 
which are consistent with his earlier (1933) study, indicated 
that mental age and chronological age are positively related 
to repetition choice of the interrupted puzzle. The results 
obtained with problem children suggested a retardation in 
this progressive tendency. He concluded that the results 
from the adult group, in which the interrupted task was 
consistently preferred, indicated that the shift from choice 
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of the completed to the interrupted tasks reaches a stable 
level after mental age thirteen or fourteen. 
Rosenzweig's (1945) study has many of the limitations 
discussed in the context of his earlier (1933) study. Again, 
the difficulty level of the puzzles was not tested prior to 
the main study nor was the effect of differences in completion 
time on the repetition choices eliminated. Only one choice 
was used as a measure of repetition choice. In addition, as 
Rosenzweig admitted, the subject samples were, in most cases, 
very small. Finally, one is left to wonder about certain 
"gaps" in the data. (Much data is unreported.) Mental ages 
were sometimes reported where chronological ages were not and 
chronological ages were sometimes reported where mental ages 
were not. 
Crandall and Rabson (I960) divided a sample of 59 
children from three to nine years of age into two groups, 
the first comprised of 30 three, four and five year olds 
and the second comprised of 29 six, seven and eight year olds. 
Each child was told that he was being tested to see how well 
he could solve puzzles and that he would be given one and a 
half minutes to complete a puzzle. Puzzle assembly was timed 
conspicuously. One of the two seven-piece puzzles (which 
pretesting had indicated were approximately equal in difficulty) 
he completed, and he was told, "You finished that one before 
your time was up." while the other was interrupted when five 
of the seven pieces were in place. He was then told, 
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"You didn't finish that one in time." The order of presentation 
of the tv/o puzzles and the completion and interruption were 
counterbalanced. Repetition choices were subsequently 
introduced. The child wan told that time remained for him to 
work on one of the two puzzles again and he was then asked 
for his choice. 
Crandall and Rabson suggested that: 
The increase in children's preferences for repeating 
previously-failed experiences begins to develop by 
early grade-school age, but is likely to continue at 
least through pre-adolescence. (p. 165) 
tfhen a Mann-Whitney U-Test was calculated to test the 
relationship between repetition choices and Stanford-Binet 
intelligence scores of the total group, no statistically 
significant relationship was found. This finding contradicts 
Rosenzweig*s (1933) report of a highly significant relation-
ship between mental age and repetition choice of the inter-
rupted task. A JC test indicated that boys returned to the 
interrupted puzzle significantly more frequently than did 
girls. 
The interactions of age and sex on repetition choice 
were also examined. In the older group, boys chose to repeat 
the interrupted puzzle significantly more frequently than did 
girls. Also, older boys chose to repeat the interrupted puzzle 
significantly more frequently than did younger boys. Crandall 
and Rabson interpreted the results of the interactions as 
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indicating that "the significant sex difference obtained 
for the total group children was primarily due to the 
fact that changes in repetition choices occurred with age 
for the boys but not for the girls" (p. 166). 
While the design of this study appears to be superior 
to that of Rosenzweig (1933, 1945), again only one repetition 
choice was employed as the dependent variable and differences 
in completion time were not controlled. 
The Developmental Theory of Success-Failure Conceptualization. 
A theoretical perspective which extended the above findings is 
the developmental theory of success-failure. 
Moss (1958), who was interested in the learning approach 
used by mental retardates, formulated a "success-striving vs. 
failure-avoiding" construct. At one end of the continuum, the 
success-striving individual was described as one with a high 
generalized expectancy (developed from reinforcements in other 
situations and generalized to the present situation) for success. 
This person responded primarily to cues which led to continued 
success. The failure-avoiding person, at the other end of the 
continuum, was one who had a low generalized expectancy for 
success. This person responded primarily to negative cues in 
the environment which led to the prevention of additional 
failure. The failure-avoiding tendency was associated with 
the retarded child. 
Moss (1958) reported a study with 39 mentally retarded 
children and 38 normal second-grade children, carried out to 
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determine if retarded children used the previously-mentioned 
learning approach. Although he found no evidence to substan-
tiate the construct, Moss* speculation that his participants 
were too young to conceptualize success and failure was 
important in generating future experiments. 
Relevant research. Both Bialer and Cromwell (i960) and 
Miller (1961) obtained evidence of developmental changes in 
the reaction of young retardates to success and failure. 
Bialer and Cromwell studied 23 educable retarded children of 
both sexes whose mental ages ranged from three years ten months 
to nine years one month and whose chronological ages ragged 
from six years six months to fourteen years two months. 
The children were told that they were being tested to see 
if they could put puzzles together as fast as the other 
children in the class and that if they did not finish on time 
they would be stopped. They were allowed to complete one of 
two jig-saw puzzles and were interrupted when five of the 
eight pieces of the other puzzle had been assembled. The 
order of presentation of the two puzzles and of interruption 
and completion were counterbalanced. When completion was 
allowed, the experimenter said, "That was fine, you finished 
in time." At interruption the experimenter said, "That wasn't 
good, you didn't finish that one in time." Repetition choices 
were made under autonomy conditions described as follows. 
When both puzzles had been attempted the experimenter 
scrambled the pieces of both puzzles, leaving them in two 
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groups, picture side up. He then moved to another side of the 
room stating that he was going to do some work and that, 
meanwhile, the child was to put one of the puzzles together. 
The experimenter pretended to do some paper work while noting 
which puzzle was chosen for repetition. 
When the participants were dichotomized by means of 
their repetition choices (either completed or incompleted), 
older children (both mentally and chronologically) were found 
to choose to repeat the interrupted task to a significantly 
greater extent than did younger children. 
Again the effect of differences in completion times on 
repetition choices was not evaluated nor did the number of 
puzzles used exceed the "usual" two. 
Miller's (1961) sample consisted of 52 young people from 
special classes for adolescent retardates. Chronological 
ages ranged from fourteen years to seventeen years seven 
months while mental ages ranged from seven years two months 
to eleven years eleven months. The eight-piece jig-saw 
puzzles and the procedure used were similar to those of the 
previous researchers. The puzzles were interrupted when six 
of the eight pieces had been assembled. The only major 
difference was in the repetition phase of the study during 
which the puzzles were rescrambled and the participant told 
that he was to put one of the puzzles together. If the 
participant had been assigned to the autonomy condition, the 
experimenter moved the stopwatch to a corner of the table and 
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went to one side of the room to do some work. The child was 
to call him when he had finished putting one puzzle together. 
If the participant had been assigned to the time-control 
condition, the experimenter remained at the table, his stopwatch 
conspicuously held above the table. The experimenter said, 
"When I say 'go', do the puzzle you want to do. If you run 
out of time, you'll be stopped. Ready?" 
Significantly more participants (22 out of 26) were 
found to repeat the interrupted puzzle under the autonomy 
condition than under the time-control condition (11 out of 
26). The relationships between mental age, chronological age 
and repetition choice were tested by means of point biserial 
correlations. The results under the time-control condition 
confirmed the earlier finding of Bialer and Cromwell (I960) 
with an older group of participants, since both mental and 
chronological age were significantly and positively related 
to repetition of the interrupted task. Zero-order correlations 
were found in the autonomy condition, a result which was not 
surprising to the authors since such a large proportion of 
participants had chosen the interrupted task in this condition. 
Bialer and Cromwell (I960) and Miller (196l) thus found 
evidence of developmental changes in the reaction of retardates 
to success and failure. Older children tended to return to the 
failure (interrupted) puzzle while younger children tended to 
return to the successful (completed) puzzle. 
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A redefinition of success and failure. At this point 
success and failure (which had typically been described, 
operationally, as observed attainment or nonattainment of a 
goal) were redefined. Success was defined as "the attainment 
of a goal under conditions where the individual attributes the 
attainment to his own effectiveness" (Cromwell, 1963, p. 62). 
Failure was defined as "the nonattainment of a goal under 
conditions where the individual attributes the outcome to his 
own (lack of) effectiveness" (Cromwell, 1963, p. 62). 
The generality of the success-striving vs. failure-
avoiding construct was also restricted. Since the indivi-
dual must be aware of his own behavioural effectiveness in 
order to conceive of success and failure, and this awareness 
of his own control in the outcome of events should develop 
with age, the success-striving vs. failure-avoiding construct 
should apply only to older individuals and only in situations 
in which the individual sees himself as being in control. 
Bialer (1961) generated a new formulation based on this 
success-failure definition and the previously-stated 
assumptions concerning its development: 
In the early stages of development, there is no 
conception of the relationship between the outcome 
of events and one's own behaviour. Consequently, 
young children, as a group, tend to view their 
experiences, both positive and negative, as being 
externally controlled and due to the whims or 
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manipulations of fate, other people, and/or 
other external forces. If the child's goal-
directed behaviour is blocked or frustrated, he 
categorizes it as an unpleasant experience— 
imposed by some outside agency. If an undertaking 
is pursued to a satisfactory conclusion, or 
gratification is achieved, it is categorized as a 
pleasant experience. The relevant cues to which 
the immature child responds are conceptualized by 
him in hedonistic terms associated with the activity, 
per se, or with its outcome. 
As development proceeds, the child begins to 
note that he is often able to influence the outcome 
of events by his own actions. He is thus more 
likely to view his goal-oriented experiences as 
being internally controlled, i.e. as consequences 
of his own behaviour. With the shift in the con-
ceptualization of locus of control from external 
to internal, there evolves the ability to categorize 
events in terms of success and failure. If goal-
attainment is recognized by the child as being due 
to his own ability, it is now not only categorized 
as a pleasant experience; it is also construed as a 
successful one. By the same token, when the child 
can conceive of an unfavorable outcome as being due 
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to his own shortcomings, this is not only unpleasant; 
it is also construed as failure. (p. 304) 
On the basis of this formulation, Bialer (196l) suggested 
that in the typical repetition choice situation which is ego-
involving, the conceptually mature child, being sensitive to 
the competitive aspect of the situation, should interpret 
completion as success and interruption as failure. In an 
effort to decrease the feeling of threat-to-self developed 
by having failed the interrupted task, this child would be 
expected to choose the interrupted task for repetition. 
The conceptually immature child, however, would be expected to 
categorize the situation in terms of pleasantness and 
unpleasantness and to repeat.the completed task in order to 
return to a previously pleasant situation. 
Bialer contended that developmental changes in success-
failure conceptualization could be observed along three 
dimensions : 
(a) a shift in perception of locus of control 
from external to internal, 
(b) a shift from response to relatively pure 
hedonistic cues to a sensitivity to cues 
associated with success and failure, and 
(c) a shift from the choice of immediate 
gratification to a willingness to delay 
gratification. (p. 306) 
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Liach of these behavioural patterns was believed to be 
contingent upon socio-intellectual maturation (defined 
in terms of mental age) and physical maturation (defined 
in terms of chronological age). 
Relevant research. In order to test this conceptuali-
zation, Bialer (1961) carried out a study involving 89 
mentally retarded and normal children from five city schools. 
Forty-four normal children from grades one to eight had 
chronological ages ranging from six years three months to 
fourteen years three months, and mental ages ranging from 
five years three months to fifteen years nine months. Forty-
five educable mentally retarded children, drawn from special 
classes, had chronological ages ranging from six years seven 
months to fourteen years three months and mental ages ranging 
from three years ten months to ten years two months. 
The experimental procedure consisted of three stages: 
administration of the locus of control scale (a scale 
adapted by the author from a self-report questionnaire for 
adults), repetition choice phase, and the gratification 
pattern tests in which the child chose between smaller, 
immediate rewards and larger, delayed rewards. 
In the repetition choice phase two eight-piece jig-saw 
puzzles were used with ego-involving instructions. Repetition 
choices were made under autonomy conditions. 
»Vhen mental age and chronological age were separately 
correlated with repetion choice, both coefficients were found 
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to be significant and positive, thus indicating that with 
increases in chronological and mental age the tendency to 
repeat the interrupted task increased. When a multiple 
correlation between mental age and chronological age (in 
combination) and repetition choice was calculated, this 
coefficient was also significant and positive. However, the 
partial beta weight for mental age was found to be substantially 
larger than that for chronological age. The hypothesis that 
mental age would be the more important variable in the success-
failure conceptualization was thus supported. 
A factor analysis resulted in a general factor which 
included all five variables (repetition choice, locus of 
control, gratification pattern, mental age and chronological 
age). All variables loaded positively; however, mental age 
loaded higher than chronological age. For this reason the 
factor was described as a "general intellectual maturation" 
factor. 
The results were interpreted as supporting the assumption 
that the ability to conceptualize success and failure develops 
more slowly in the retarded than in the normal child. 
The present author would draw attention to the fact that 
again only two puzzles were employed in this research and that 
completion time was not equated across participants of 
different ages. 
Butterfield (1965) used a 2 x 2 x 2 (age x locus of 
control x instructions) factorial design to study repetition 
19 
choices of 64 normal children from grade four and 64 normal 
children from grade six. The children from each age group 
were subdivided into internal and external locus of control 
groups by administration of a group locus of control test 
(Children's Locus of Evaluation-Control Scale). The middle 
third of the distribution was then eliminated. These groups 
were further subdivided into skill and nonskill groups. In 
the skill condition children were introduced to the experi-
mental tasks with instructions which led them to believe that 
the tasks were intelligence tests designed to indicate how 
clever they were. The experimenter pointed out that he would 
be timing the child and, if he did not finish on time he would 
be stopped. When these children were interrupted, they were 
told, "Your time is up. You didn't finish in time." In the 
repetition choice phase of the experiment these children were 
told that they would repeat some of the tests and that they 
would again be timed. While the child worked on the tasks the 
experimenter held the stopwatch prominently before him and 
recorded the time conspicuously. The child then chose which 
puzzle in each of three pairs (each comprised of one completed 
and one incompleted puzzle) he would like to repeat, after the 
experimenter had pointed out which puzzle of each pair he had 
previously finished on time and which he had not finished on 
time. 
To the children in the nonskill condition the experimenter 
explained that they were helping him to find out about some 
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games he was going to use later with children from their 
grade levels. Each child was told that when he was stopped 
before he had finished that meant that the experimenter had 
seen enough of that game and the child could go on to the 
next one. While the child worked on the task, the stopwatch 
was inconspicuously placed and time for completion was recorded 
unobtrusively. In the repetition phase the child was told that 
the experimenter wanted to find out which puzzles children of 
his grade level preferred to repeat. As in the skill condition, 
the child chose which of two puzzles (for three sets) he 
wished to repeat, after the experimenter had pointed out which 
one had been completed and which one he had not finished. 
All children were individually given, one at a time, six 
puzzles with six rectangular pieces to complete. They then 
were asked to recall the tasks they had worked on. (This part 
of the study will be discussed later.) Afterwards, they made 
their repetition choices. 
A significant grade x instructions interaction indicated 
that under skill instructions the older children chose more 
incompleted tasks than did the younger children, while there 
was no difference between younger and older children under 
nonskill instructions. These results were interpreted as 
supporting the developmental view of competence motivation, 
rather than any other age-related factor since the difference 
occurred under skill but not under nonskill instructions. 
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It is to be noted that the shape of the puzzles used 
in this study was rectangular, rather than the jig-saw type 
used by the majority of the previous researchers. This 
difference may be important and lead to differences in tasks 
chosen for repetition. 
Young (1972) studied the effects of task difficulty, 
chronological age, placement of blame and expectancy of 
success on the repetition choice behaviour of 144 normal 
boys from the first, fourth and seventh grades. The mental 
ages of these participants fell within the average range of 
intelligence on the Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test, while 
the mean chronological ages of the three grade groupings were 
six years five months, nine years five months, and twelve 
years four months, respectively. 
The children were randomly assigned to one of two task 
conditions. In the Controlled Task Difficulty condition, 
participants at the three grade levels were presented a 
different pair of designs which pretesting had indicated 
were of moderate difficulty for their ages and intellectual 
abilities. The block designs subtest of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children was selected as the experi-
mental task for this condition. Several designs were matched 
to the participants' ages by means of the Table of Test Age 
equivalents of the WISC (Wechsler, 1949). A pilot study was 
undertaken to test the difficulty of these designs. Two 
designs of comparable mean completion times were selected for 
each grade level. 
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In the Uncontrolled Task Difficulty condition, all 
participants worked on the same designs, Jix designs which 
were similar to the .VISC block designs were selected. These 
six designs were given to another pilot sample of ten parti-
cipants from each of the three grade levels. Since mean 
completion times at each of the grade levels were very close, 
two designs were chosen at random as experimental tasks for 
this condition. (An analysis of variance indicated that the 
difference between mean completion times over the three groups 
was highly significant.) 
The tasks consisted of arranging blocks to duplicate 
designs printed on cards. Each participant attempted two 
designs, one which he was allowed to complete and one which 
was interrupted prior to completion. The number of blocks 
required to complete a design was either four or nine. 
Participants were told that they were being timed and that 
failure to complete a design would be counted as failure. 
Each was allowed to practise on design A of the WISC. The 
experimenter pretended to time the participant during block 
assembly. After both designs had been attempted, the parti-
cipant was allowed to repeat one design. 
The conditions for repetition choice were dissimilar to 
those used by previous experimenters. The experimenter was 
present; however, the stopwatch was removed. After the 
participant had made his choice but prior to block assembly 
each participant was asked why one of the designs was not 
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completed; his response was recorded and these data were 
used to categorize the participants with respect to placement 
of blame. At the completion of the experiment each participant 
was asked why he had chosen a particular design. 
The results relevant to the present research indicated 
differences in repetition choices depending on task condition. 
When the same pair of designs was presented to children 
differing in age, a chi square analysis indicated that older 
children (from grades four and seven) significantly more 
frequently chose to repeat the interrupted design. Children 
from grade one showed no distinct preference for either design. 
However, when different pairs of designs of comparable diffi-
culty were used for different grades, no distinct preference 
for either design was noted. Young interpreted her findings 
as suggesting that the developmental trend toward repetition 
choice of the interrupted task reported by previous researchers 
may have been a result of failure to control for task difficulty. 
She stated that in previous studies the older children, 
realizing that the interrupted task was an easy one which 
they could complete when given another opportunity, repeated 
that task. The younger children, finding the interrupted 
task more challenging, chose, instead, the completed task. 
The present author finds these results provocative. 
Indeed, the developmental trend in repetition choice of the 
interrupted task may be a result of failure to equate the 
tasks on difficulty level across age groups prior to 
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experimentation. However, Young did not mention having 
equated the tasks used in the Uncontrolled Task Difficulty 
condition in terms of completion time or of statistically 
removing the effect of differing completion times using a 
covariance analysis. The present author contends that a 
true test of the developmental trend in success-failure 
conceptualization requires that this condition be met. It 
is also interesting that Young used block designs as the 
experimental tasks, while other researchers used puzzles 
and that her participants duplicated designs printed on cards. 
It is also possible that the less ego-involving conditions 
under which repetition choices were made contributed to the 
negative results. 
Summary and integration with the present study. The 
experiments relating repetition choice and chronological age 
and mental age of children which have used puzzles as the 
experimental tasks are numerous. In his two studies, 
Rosenzweig (1933» 19^5) found that both mental age and 
chronological age were positively correlated with repetition 
choice of the interrupted task. Crandall and Rabson (I960) 
found a nonsignificant tendency for children to choose the 
interrupted rather than the completed task with increases in 
chronological age. For boys, the relationship between repetition 
choice and chronological age was significant and positive. 
However, no such relationship was found for girls. These 
researchers suggested that the tendency to repeat the interrupted 
task continues to develop at least through preadolescence. 
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Bialer and Cromwell (i960), Miller (1961) and Butter-
field (1965) also found positive relationships between mental 
age, chronological age and repetition choice of the interrupted 
task. 
In four of the studies (Rosenzweig, 1933» Rosenzweig, 
1945; Bialer and Cromwell, I960; Bialer, 1961) children of 
ages ten and thirteen were included in the sample. All 
four have indicated that both chronological age and mental 
age are positively related to repetition choice of the 
interrupted task. Bialer (1961) has suggested that mental age, 
rather than chronological age, is the more important variable. 
The author would predict, therefore, that a group of boys aged 
thirteen whose mental ages are within the average range of 
intelligence would more frequently choose to repeat interrupted 
tasks (when given choices between completed and interrupted 
tasks) than a group of boys aged ten whose mental ages are 
within the average range of intelligence. 
In none of these studies was time taken for puzzle 
completion equated for the age levels of the participants 
involved. The present author will attempt to equate completion 
times in order to reduce this possible source of variability. 
Chronological Age, Mental Age and Recall Scores 
In addition to their studies of age and repetition choices 
researchers have examined the relationship between chronological 
age, mental age and recall scores (the number of interrupted 
tasks remembered after the series of tasks have been presented), 
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using the interrupted task paradigm. The most relevant 
theory in the present context is the Freudian theory of 
repression. 
The psychoanalytic theory of repression. Rosenzweig 
(1938) used the interrupted task paradigm as a means of 
studying the Freudian theory of repression. Repression 
Rosenzweig described as: 
a mechanism of ego-defence resorted to in the face 
of intolerable frustrations occasioned by conflict 
between some positive drive and the need to preserve 
self-respect. In the process some impulse is usually 
denied expression and associated ideas or images are 
forcibly forgotten. (p. 473) 
To test the theory of repression Rosenzweig tried to bring about 
experiences of conative striving which come into 
conflict with the pride of self-respect of the 
subject, e.g. experiences of failure. If it is 
shown that such experiences are forgotten more 
frequently than comparable experiences of a 
successful nature, evidence of stimulus repression 
has presumptively been obtained. (p. 475) 
Relevant research. The first of a series of experiments 
on repression was undertaken by Rosenzweig and Mason (193*0 
with a sample of 40 crippled, institutionalized children of 
both sexes whose ages ranged from five years six months to 
fourteen years eight months. To arouse a genuine need in the 
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children, the experiment was described as a test to determine 
how well the children could solve puzzles. A prize was to 
be awarded to the child who did best. The children were 
individually given a series of jig-saw puzzles to assemble. 
The number of pieces in a given puzzle varied from four to 
eight and the number of puzzles attempted varied from four 
to fourteen, depending upon how many the child could assemble 
in 45 minutes. The children were told that varying amounts 
of time would be allowed for the solution of the puzzles, 
according to their difficulty. They were given a card showing 
a miniature reproduction of the puzzle in completed form before 
beginning work on each puzzle. Each child was allowed to 
complete half of the total number of puzzles attempted and 
was interrupted just before or just after he had assembled 
half of the pieces of the other puzzles. After a puzzle 
was successfully completed the experimenter said, "That's 
good." while after failure he said, "You didn't do that one 
so well." 
When the child had worked on the puzzles for about 45 
minutes an interval of one minute was allowed. Then the 
experimenter asked him to recall the names of all the puzzles. 
When "relative recall scores" 
/number of completed puzzles recalled interrupted recalled> 
^number of completed puzzles given ~ interrupted given ' 
were considered, no clear relationship between chronological 
age and recall was evident. With respect to mental age, 
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however, it was observed that the group who recalled completed 
better than incompleted tasks was differentiated from the group 
who recalled incompleted better than completed tasks by a more 
advanced mental age. However, no statistical analysis of this 
difference was reported. 
The results of this experiment were perceived as 
supporting the Freudian theory of repression. The authors 
concluded that: 
given an individual of sufficient intellectual 
maturity and a commensurate measure of pride, 
experiences that are unpleasant because they 
wound self-respect—perhaps it should be added 
in a social situation—are, other things being 
equal, less apt to be remembered than experiences 
that are gratifying to the ego. (Rosenzweig and 
Mason, 193^# p. 258) 
It is to be noted that the participants in this study 
did not solve the same number of puzzles, nor were the 
puzzles equated in terms of completion time across the age 
levels involved. 
The results of this experiment were considered with those 
of the previous experiment undertaken by Rosenzweig (1933), 
involving preferences in the repetition of successful and 
unsuccessful puzzles. In this earlier experiment with the 
same participants the researcher had found that the younger 
children consistently chose to repeat puzzles on which they 
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had had success whereas the older children chose to repeat 
puzzles in which they had experienced failure. In the present 
experiment on recall Rosenzweig and Mason found that the 
younger children, who tended to recall failures (interrupted 
tasks), had formerly preferred to repeat successes while the 
older children, who tended to recall successes (completed 
tasks), had preferred to repeat failures. This finding was 
interpreted as implying that: 
stimulus repression failed to occur in individuals 
who were still functioning riaively in accordance 
with the pleasure principle; or, more parsimoniously 
stated, that unless failure was experienced as 
wounding to self-respect and requiring social 
vindication, there was no basis for stimulus 
repression and it hence did not occur. (Rosenzweig, 
1938, p. 481) 
These results were construed as indicating that repression 
is a defense mechanism resorted to relatively late in the 
development of the child. 
Sanford (1946) repeated Rosenzweig and Mason's (193*+) 
procedure with normal, private school children whom he 
described as highly ambitious. Of the fifteen tasks used he 
allowed the children to complete one more puzzle than the 
number of puzzles which were interrupted since he felt that 
failure would be difficult for them. One set of puzzles was 
presented to 49 children in 1936; a different set was presented 
to 26 of the same children two and one-half years later. 
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When the percentage of participants who recalled 
interrupted tasks better than completed tasks was plotted 
against chronological age, the data indicated that with 
increasing chronological age children recalled more failures. 
No statistical test was employed. Rosenzweig and r.lason (1934) 
had previously found no such tendency. Sanford also found 
that for both sets of puzzles, a preference for the interrupted 
task in recall increased with mental age. Again, no statistical 
test was cited. This is contrary to Rosenzweig and Mason's 
(193*0 results which showed an increasing tendency to recall 
the completed tasks as mental age increased. 
Sanford interpreted the results of his experiment as 
contradicting Rosenzweig's (1938) theory of repression. His 
results showed that repression does not increase with either 
mental age or chronological age. He found that 
the tendency to remember failures better than 
successes increases with chronological age, 
during the years 7 to 15 and with mental age in 
the range of 10 to 21 years. (Sanford, 1943, p. 31*0 
In addition, he suggested that Rosenzweig and Mason's findings 
may have been a result of the immaturity of their participants 
in terms of ego development and mental age. 
Butterfield (1965) undertook an experiment with 128 
children drawn from fourth and sixth grades. Mental ages 
of the children were calculated from group-administered 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Tests (Dunn, 1959). The design 
31 
and puzzle assembly instructions have been described earlier 
in this paper. The tasks consisted of six puzzles of enlarged 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test plates cut into six rectangles. 
Three of the puzzles were interrupted when four of the six 
pieces had been correctly assembled. 
After the six puzzles had been individually attempted, 
the child was asked to recall the names of the puzzles. The 
children in the skill groups were told that this was part of 
their test while children in the nonskill groups were informed 
that the experimenter wanted to find out how easy the tasks 
were to remember. 
The number of completed and interrupted puzzles recalled 
for each of the eight groups was compared in a 2 x 2 x 2 
(age x locus of control x instructions) analysis of variance. 
The incompleted-completed recall findings did not support 
Rosenzweig's contention that differential recall reflects 
repression induced by ego threat. According to the repression 
hypothesis, there should have been less recall of incompleted 
tasks under skill than under nonskill conditions. In this study, 
both completed and incompleted task recall were unaffected by 
instructions. With regard to recall of incompleted tasks, 
the data suggested that recall of incompleted tasks increases, 
but not to a significant extent, with chronological age and 
mental age, a finding which was not reported by Butterfield. 
The puzzles employed by Butterfield were not jig-saw 
type like those used by Sanford (1946) and Rosenzweig and 
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Mason (1934). The pieces were rectangular. It may be that 
the differences in the configuration of the puzzles contri-
buted to Butterfield's negative results. 
Summary and integration with the present study. The 
studies which deal with the recall of interrupted and completed 
tasks using the interrupted task paradigm have stemmed, 
primarily, from one theoretical background - the Freudian 
theory of repression. Rosenzweig and Mason (193*0 found no 
evidence of a relationship between recall of interrupted 
tasks and chronological age. Mental age was found to be 
positively related to recall of completed tasks. Sanford 
(19*1-6), using the same procedure as had Rosenzweig and Mason, 
with normal children, found evidence of positive relationships 
between both chronological age and mental age, and recall of 
the interrupted task. 
Hence, two of these studies indicate that mental age 
and recall of the incompleted task are positively related. 
Rosenzweig and Mason's (193*0 study would predict a positive 
relationship between chronological age and recall of completed 
tasks; however, the present author suggests, after Sanford 
(1946), that these children may not have been ego-involved 
in the tasks and, hence, recalled incompleted tasks less 
frequently than completed tasks. 
There are possible extraneous variables which may have 
contributed to the findings of these studies. In only one 
study (Butterfield, 1965) was an effort made to equate the 
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puzzles on time taken for completion. Moreover, Rosenzweig 
and Mason (193*0 report having allowed the number of tasks 
attempted to vary from four to fourteen over the participants. 
Since pilot work for the present study revealed a significant 
difference in time taken for completion of puzzles by grade 
five and grade eight boys, it would seem important to statistically 
remove the effects of completion time. Consistent with Sanford 
(1946) and Rosenzweig and Mason (193*0 . then, it is predicted 
that (controlling for completion time) thirteen year old boys 
whose mental ages are in the average range of intelligence will 
recall significantly more interrupted tasks than will ten year 
old boys whose mental ages are in the average range of 
intelligence. 
The Interrupted Task Paradigm and Performers vs. Observers 
Mowrer (I960), when describing a form of empathetic 
learning, suggested that an observer can vicariously experience 
emotional responses experienced by a model. He stated: 
If an observing organism, B, experiences some of 
the same immediate sensory consequences of A's 
behavior as A experiences it and also "intuits" 
A's satisfactions (or dissatisfactions), then we 
may suppose that B will be rendered more or less 
likely to repeat A's behavior, although, to what 
is involved in simple imitation, is here added the 
element of empathy. (p. 115) 
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Although in the present context the observer will not be 
requested to imitate a modeled sequence of behaviour, the 
vicariously experienced emotional responses which Mowrer 
described may be important in determining the observer's 
recall of incompleted and completed tasks and his repetition 
choices. 
If, as Mowrer suggests, humans can acquire emotional 
responses similar to those experienced by the model, it 
follows that observers can vicariously experience emotional 
responses of satisfaction which the task performers experience 
when they are told that they have finished on time and emotional 
responses of dissatisfaction when they are told they have run 
overtime and a task is left incomplete. 
Lewis and Franklin (1944) found that objective completion 
of an interrupted activity can, indeed, resolve an observer's 
dissatisfactions with an incompleted task. In this study 23 
participants, working alone, performed a heterogeneous series 
of 18 tasks (including jig-saw puzzles, anagrams, braiding, 
and limericks) nine of which were completed and nine of which 
were interrupted before completion. The latter were interrupted 
by the experimenter who said, "I'll take that now." The 
experimenter subsequently moved the task from the participant's 
work table and completed it while the participant watched. The 
participant was then asked to recall the tasks. 
Lewis and Franklin found that recall ratios, 
average number of incompleted tasks recalled . 
average number of completed tasks recalled a n 
35 
average number of incompleted tasks recalled were signi-
average number of total tasks recalled 
ficantly smaller under these conditions than when the experi-
menter had not completed the interrupted tasks. Thus, completion 
of a task by a person other than the participant himself may 
be as satisfying as his own completion of the task. 
Participants' spontaneous comments recorded while the 
experimenter was completing the tasks indicated that the 
participants were vicariously experiencing the satisfaction of 
task completion. One participant said, "When you (the E) 
started to do them, I more or less did them with you and in a 
way completed them" (Lewis and Franklin, 1944, p. 208). 
Another participant remarked, when the experimenter had 
finished his clay house, "Oh, I was going to make a verandah, 
but our joint house is O.K." (p. 208). Most participants 
found the experimenter's completion less satisfying than 
their own, but, as one remarked, "Your (i.e. the E's) 
finishing was better than letting things hang in mid-air" 
(p. 208). 
If, as Lewis and Franklin's study indicates, participants' 
tensions toward completion left unresolved when a task is 
interrupted, can be resolved when another person objectively 
completes the task, and if observers can, as the research 
indicates, vicariously experience the satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction of task completion and incompletion respectively, 
it would seem plausible that observers who view a model 
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performing a series of tasks, half of which are completed 
and half of which are left incompleted, should vicariously 
experience the emotional reactions of the model. When tasks 
are completed by the model, observers are expected to 
experience satisfaction vicariously. When tasks are 
interrupted before completion, observers are expected to 
experience vicarious dissatisfaction, leading to subsequent 
superior recall of incompleted as compared with completed 
tasks and repetition choices of relatively more incompleted 
than completed tasks. 
The spontaneous comments of observers in the Lewis and 
Franklin (1944) study in which observers witnessed objective 
task completion of previously incompleted tasks suggest that 
task tensions are not resolved to such an extent as would have 
occurred had the observer completed the tasks himself. Hence, 
one would expect that tensions toward completion would not be 
as pronounced in observers as in performers. Observers are 
expected to be less task-involved than actual performers. 
The present author, therefore, expects that there will be 
significant differences between ten year old performers and 
ten year old observers, as well as between the thirteen year 
old observers and performers. Performers in both age groups 
should recall more and choose to repeat more interrupted tasks 
than should observers. 
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A further set of expectations can be derived in light 
of Piaget and Inhelder"s (1969) description of the growth 
in children's intellectual functioning with age. Boys of 
ages seven to eleven are in the concrete operations stage 
of development while boys of ages twelve to fifteen are 
in the last stage of intellectual development, the stage 
of formal thought. 
Indeed, the essential difference between formal 
thought and concrete operations is that the latter 
are centred on reality, whereas the former grasps 
the possible transformations and assimilates reality 
only in terms of imagined or deduced events. The 
change of perspective is as important for affective 
as for cognitive development, for the world of values 
also can remain bound by concrete and perceptible reality, 
or it can encompass many interpersonal and social 
possibilities. (p. 149) 
The cognitive development of boys aged thirteen is, 
therefore, more advanced than that of boys aged ten. The 
cognitive-developmental capabilities described should 
influence observers' understanding of the emotions of 
models and, consequently, influence their vicarious experi-
encing of the emotional responses of the model. In their 
study with three groups of children whose mean ages were 
four years three months, seven years four months and ten 
years three months Leifer at al. (1971) found a clear 
38 
effect of age on children's ability to report the motivations 
and feelings of characters in a film. 
If, therefore, cognitive capacities show a develop-
mental increase with a^e, and the ability to understand and 
report a model's emotions increases with age, one would 
anticipate that, with increases in age, boys would be better 
able to experience the emotional reactions of dissatisfaction 
of peer models who are interrupted on a task before completion 
and the satisfaction of peer models who are allowed to complete 
a task. Consequently, the older, thirteen year old boys 
would be expected to recall and to choose to repeat more 
incompleted tasvs than the younger, ten year old boys. 
However, a review of the literature has failed to 
produce any interrupted task studies which are directly 
relevant to this aspect of the present research. In addition, 
since the above line of reasoning is largely speculative, no 




Hypothesis 1: ;iffect of Age on Repetition Choices 
A relationship exists between repetition choice and 
age, such that older children will choose to repeat signi-
ficantly more interrupted tasks than younger boys (controlling 
statistically for completion time). 
Hypothesis ?.: Effect of Age on Recall Scores 
A relationship exists between recall and age, such 
that older children will recall significantly more inter-
rupted tasks than will younger boys (controlling statis-
tically for completion time). 
In addition, as indicated previously, certain expec-
tations are tentatively held regarding the effects of being 
a performer or an observer on recall and repetition choice. 
The author wishes to extend the use of the interrupted task 
paradigm to observers and to follow up Lewis and Franklin's 
(1944) finding that completion of one's own task by another 
person "may offer some release of the task - completion tension 
- system" (p. 208). It is expected that performers will 
recall and choose to repeat more interrupted tasks than 
observers. Also, thirteen year olds are expected to recall 
and choose to repeat more incompleted tasks than the younger, 
ten year old boys. However, because of the tenuous nature 
of these expectations, no formal hypotheses are offered. 
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Method 
The Pilot Study 
Before the present study was carried out, a brief 
pilot study was completed in order to assess completion 
times for the experimental tasks, to determine if a time 
effect and a serial order effect existed and to find the 
number of puzzles recalled by a sample of participants 
similar to those of the present study. This study is 
reported in Appendix A. 
Subjects 
Twenty-six boys whose mean chronological age was ten 
years two months and twenty-two boys whose mean chrono-
logical age was thirteen years participated in this study. 
Because of procedural difficulties the author was unable to 
equate the numbers of participants in the two age groups. 
All were from three Separate Schools in Kitchener, Ontario. 
The chronological ages of the ten year old boys ranged from 
nine years eight months to ten years nine months while the 
mean grade level was 4.2. The age range of the thirteen 
year olds was twelve years six months to thirteen years 
eight months while the mean grade level was 7.1. The 
mental ages of the boys, as ascertained by their principals 
on the basis of test scores and class placement, were within 
the average range of intelligence expected for each 
chronological age group. 
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Since the author did not wish to study the effect of 
sex on recall and repetition choice and since Crandall and 
Rabson (i960) had found a significant difference in 
repetition choice for boys but not for girls she confined 
her sample to boys. 
Stimulus Materials 
Most previous researchers had used only two puzzles. 
The present author wished to obtain reliable measures of 
recall and repetition choice by utilizing nine sets of puzzles. 
Eighteen twelve-piece jig-saw puzzles devised by the 
author were cut from 7 x 9 inch (17.78 x 22.86 cm) masonite. 
The masonite was painted white and pictures of birds and 
animals were then drawn in black magic marker. (Table A in 
Appendix B lists the subject of each puzzle.) 
One 7 x 9 inch white masonite board was left unmarked 
in order to indicate to each participant whether the next 
puzzle was a horizontal or vertical one. The pieces of each 
puzzle were placed on 12 x 18 inch (30.48 x 45.72 cm) masonite 
boards in the same scrambled position for each participant. 
The twelve pieces were ranged beforehand in three rows, 
four pieces per row, by means of numbers printed on their 
blank sides. 
Procedure 
The boys at each grade level were randomly assigned 
to either the "performer" or "observer" condition and were 
randomly paired. In each pair a boy assigned to the "performer" 
condition assembled the puzzles while the boy assigned to the 
"observer" condition watched the performer. 
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Experimenters A and B met the two boys simultaneously 
at their respective classrooms, experimenter A obtaining 
a "performer" and experimenter B obtaining an "observer". 
Experimenter A told the performer, "I'm Laurie Davidson. 
I want to see how fast you can put some puzzles together. 
What is your name? age? birthday?" This information was 
recorded on the data sheet (see Figure 1 in Appendix B). 
Experimenter B, another female (in another corner of the 
hall) told the "observer" her name and asked him his name, 
age and birthday, recording this on her data sheet (see 
Figure 2 in Appendix B). She then explained, "You are going 
to watch another boy of your age put some puzzles together. 
Please do not say anything or make any noise while you watch." 
Both experimenters then brought the students into the 
experimental room. The performer was seated across the table 
from experimenter A, while the observer sat on a chair at the 
edge of the table between her arid the performer. Experimenter 
B was seated just behind the observer. The relative positions 
of experimenters and participants are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 
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Experimenter A then told the performer: 
"I have a set of eighteen jig-saw puzzles which you 
are to put together. All of the puzzles are this 
size (shows white masonite blank), but the pictures 
on some of them go this way (turns blank lengthways) 
and some go this way (turns blank sideways). I'll 
tell you which way the picture goes before you start 
and also what the picture is. You have only a 
certain length of time in which to put the puzzle 
together. If you don't finish on time, I'll stop 
you, so try to work quickly. Do you have any 
questions?" 
She then asked, "What are you to do?" and, if the 
boy did not say (approximately), "I'm to put the puzzles 
together as fast as I can." she again explained this to him. 
The eighteen puzzles were presented in a different 
randomly-determined order for each of the boys. Random orders 
for each boy were generated, using a random number table 
(Senders, 1958, pp. 551 - 565)• A coin toss was then used 
to determine which puzzles in each series would be completed 
and which puzzles in each series would be left incomplete 
with the stipulation that no more than two of each type 
(completed or incomplete) would appear in sequence. The 
pieces for each of the puzzles were placed on masonite 
boards, picture side up and left covered on a chair until 
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presented. The experimenter placed the pieces for each 
puzzle, in turn, in front of the child saying, "This is a 
picture of a (name of the puzzle) and it goes this way," 
moving the white masonite blank to indicate the direction in 
which the picture faced and leaving it at one side. "See 
how fast you can put it together. Go." She recorded the 
puzzle completion time with her stopwatch held in full view. 
A randomly-determined half of the puzzles were 
interrupted when eight of the twelve pieces had been assembled. 
When a puzzle was interrupted experimenter A placed her hand 
over the pieces, saying, "Your time is up. You didn't 
finish on time." and moved the pieces onto the masonite 
board which she placed on a chair beside her and covered 
with a manilla folder. Experimenter B recorded on her data 
sheet which four pieces were left unassembled. 
/Vhen puzzle completion was allowed, the experimenter 
said, "O.K. You finished that one on time." The time 
between the activity on one puzzle and the beginning of the 
next was kept constant at 30 seconds. 
When all puzzles had been presented, experimenter 
B took the observer to another room (or, in the case of one 
school, to the hall) and seated him across the table from her. 
Experimenter A and the performer remained where they were. 
Then both experimenters told their boys, "I'd like to ask 
you a few questions about the puzzles. Can you remember 
the pictures on the puzzles? Tell me the ones you recall." 
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These they recorded in order of recall. The experimenters 
then asked the boys to choose between pairs of puzzles. 
Nine pairs, each comprised of one completed and one uncompleted 
puzzle which had been next to each other in the sequence 
presented, were verbally presented. For each pair the 
experimenters asked, "Do you remember these two puzzles, 
the (name of puzzle) and the (name of puzzle)? Which one 
would you like to put together now?" They then recorded 
which puzzles were remembered and underlined the repetition 
choice made. When all choices had been made the experimenters 
answered any questions the boys had about the research, asked 
them not to tell the other children about the research, and 
thanked them for their co-operation. If time permitted, the 
boys then assembled a few of those puzzles which they selected 
and then returned to their classrooms. 
It might have been preferable to debrief the parti-
cipants after the data in each school had been collected. 
In this case there would have been no chance of later performers 
learning of the manipulation concerning the interrupted 
puzzles. However, debriefing was accomplished before the 
participants returned to their classes since the author did 
not want the children to be concerned about their poor 
performance on the interrupted puzzles. As it was, the 
author is quite certain that information about the experimental 
manipulations did not reach later participants. 
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It is to be noted that at one school the students 
were tested in two rooms in a three-room van parked beside 
the school since facilities inside the school were unavailable. 
For the same reason the experimenters used one room and a 
quiet hall outside this room at a second school. At the third 
school the experimenters used two large, adjoining rooms. 
Results 
Repetition Choices 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of numbers 
of puzzles chosen for repetition by age and condition. 
Because the numbers of participants in the performer and 
observer conditions differed and because for performers 
"time" referred to puzzle assembly time, while for observers 
"time" referred to observation time, separate analyses of 
covariance were performed for each of the conditions. 
When the Cochrane C test for homogeneity of variance 
was employed, the variance scores for time taken for 
interrupted puzzle assembly for the ten and thirteen year old 
performers were nonhomogeneous, C (2, 12) = .83, p_ <^- .05. 
However, Norton (1952) has shown that the F test is robust 
and that violations of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance have little effect on the percentages of F ratios 
exceeding the theoretical five percent and one percent limits. 
Table 2 shows the analysis of covariance of performer 
repetition choices, which was undertaken to determine if 
assembly time for these puEEles affected the repetition 
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Table 1 
Interrupted Puzzles Chosen by Age and Condition 
Age 
Condition 10 13 
X s X s Overall X 
Performer 3.69 1.52 4.36 1.41 4.0 
Observer 5.31 1.10 5.20 1.21 5.26 
Overall 4.50 4.76 4.62 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Covariance on Age 10 and 13 Performers' 
Repetition Choices 
Analysis of Variance Source df MS 





Assembly Time for 
Interrupted Puzzles Between Age Groups 1 833,552.505 4 
Within 22 182,775.060 
Total 23 





*p_ < .05 
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scores of the two age groups. Time had little effect. The 
analysis of variance on repetition choices was nonsignificant 
as was the adjusted analysis of variance. 
Table 3 shows a similar analysis of covariance which was 
performed on observers' repetition choices to determine if 
assembly time for the interrupted puzzles affected the repetition 
choices of the two groups. (One boy in the thirteen year old 
group remembered all of the puzzles, as did the others, but 
refused to make repetition choices.) Time had little effect. 
The analysis of variance on repetition choices was non-
significant, as was the adjusted analysis of variance. 
Since the time taken for interrupted task assembly did 
not markedly affect the number of interrupted puzzles chosen 
for repetition by the ten and thirteen year old performers 
and observers, a 2 x 2 (age x condition) factorial analysis 
of variance was performed in order to assess the interaction 
as well as the main effects. Rao's Least Square Solution for 
Unequal Cell Frequencies (Winer, 1962) was used. The raw data 
for this analysis are shown in Table A, Appendix C while Table 
4 shows the results of the two-way analysis of variance. 
As shown in Table 4, the effect of condition was significant, 
F (1,43) = 10.18, p_ «=d.01, such that observers chose to 
repeat more interrupted puzzles (X = 5.26) than did performers 




Analysis of Covariance on Age 10 and 13 Observers' 
Repetition Choices 
Analysis of Variance 
Recall Scores 
Source df 






Assembly Time for 
Interrupted Puzzles Between Age Groups 1 77*+,812.517 
Within 21 192,403.719 
Total 22 





*0ne boy in the thirteen year old group remembered all of the 
puzzles but refused to make repetition choices. 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance of Repetition Choices 
Source 
























*p_ <C .01 
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Recall Scores 
Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of 
numbers of puzzles recalled by age and condition. Table 
6 shows the analysis of covariance of performer recall 
scores (number of interrupted puzzles recalled) which was 
undertaken to determine if assembly time for these puzzles 
affected the recall scores of the two age groups. Time had 
little effect. The analysis of variance on recall scores of 
the ten and thirteen year old performers was nonsignificant 
as was the adjusted analysis of variance. 
A similar analysis of covariance was undertaken for 
observer recall scores and is shown in Table 7. Again, 
assembly time had no effect. The analysis of variance on 
recall scores was nonsignificant as was the adjusted 
analysis of variance. 
Since the time taken for interrupted task assembly 
did not affect the number of interrupted puzzles recalled 
by the ten and thirteen year old performers or observers a 
2 x 2 (age x condition) analysis of variance was performed 
in order to assess the interaction as well as the main effects. 
(Raw data are shown in Table B, Appendix C.) Rao's Least 
Square Solution for Unequal Cell Frequencies was again used 
(Winer, 1962). Table 8 shows the results of the two-way 
analysis of variance. Neither of the main effects, nor the 
interaction was significant. 
5*> 
Table 5 
Interrupted Tasks Recalled by Age and Condition 
Age 
Condition 10 13 
X s X s Overall X 
Performer 3.k6 1.15 *+.27 1.15 3.83 
Observer 4.07 1.23 3«**5 1.25 3-79 
Overall 3*77 3.86 3.81 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Covariance on Age 10 and 13 Performers' 
Recall Scores 
Analysis of Variance Source df MS 
Recall Scores Between Age Groups 1 3.92 2 
Within 22 4.428 
Total 23 
Assembly Time for 
Interrupted Puzzles Between Age Groups 1 833,552.505 4 
Within 22 182,775-060 
Total 23 
Adjusted Between Age Groups 1 3.718 2 
Within 21 4.495 
To ta l 22 
*p_ <C .05 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Covariance on Age 10 and 13 Observers* 
















Assembly Time for 
Interrupted Puzzles Between Age Groups 
Within 
Total 
1 833,552.505 ^.56* 
22 182,775.060 
23 






Analysis of Variance of Recall Scores 
Source SS df MS 


























Chronological Age, Mental Age and Repetition Choices 
One of the most important findings in a number of previous 
studies employing the interrupted task paradigm has been the 
existence of a developmental trend such that with increases 
in mental and chronological age, the tendency toward 
repetition choice of the interrupted task increases 
(Rosenzweig, 1933. 1945; Bialer and Cromwell, I960; 
Miller, 1961; Butterfield, 1965). In four of these studies 
(Rosenzweig, 1933. 1945; Bialer and Cromwell, I960; Bialer, 
1961) performers of ages ten and thirteen, the ages of the 
children in the present study, were included in the sample. 
In two of these studies (Rosenzweig, 19335 Bialer and 
Cromwell, i960) mental ages of the participants were lower 
than those of the present normal participants. Hence only 
two of the previous studies are directly analogous to the 
present study. The results of the study undertaken by 
Young (1972), however, challenged the developmental findings 
of the earlier research. In her study, Young found that 
repetition choice was unrelated to age. When block designs 
of comparable difficulty were presented to children at 
three grade levels the developmental tendency for repetition 
of the interrupted task disappeared. Only when the same 
set of block designs was presented to children at the three 
grade levels was the previously reported developmental 
trend obtained. 
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In the present study, in which jig-saw puzzles were 
used as the experimental tasks, no significant differences 
were found in the number of interrupted tasks chosen for 
repetition by ten and thirteen year old performers whose 
mental ages were in the average range of intelligence. 
Thus, no evidence was obtained to support hypothesis one, 
that a relationship exists between repetition choice and 
age, such that older boys will choose to repeat signifi-
cantly more interrupted tasks than younger boys. 
The difference in completion times for the interrupted 
puzzles for the two age levels, which had been suggested 
as a possible reason for the developmental tendency, was 
found to be unimportant in the evaluation of the differences 
in repetition choices. The covariance analysis indicated 
that the difference in the repetition choices of the ten 
and thirteen year old boys remained nonsignificant when the 
covariate, completion time, was included. 
A number of possibilities are apparent in attempting 
to explain the discrepancy between the present findings 
and previous research. For example, the presence of a 
peer who observed puzzle assembly may somehow have interfered 
with the expected greater tendency of older performers 
to choose to repeat more interrupted tasks. Perhaps 
the performer assumed that puzzle assembly would again 
take place in the observer's presence and he, therefore, 
failed to choose the interrupted tasks as an ego-defence 
6o 
mechanism. Not wishing to return to a previously 
unsuccessful experience (especially in the presence of a 
peer), he chose, instead, the completed (successful) puzzle. 
Another possibility is that the present findings are a 
result of the variability in the chronological ages of the boys 
who participated in the study and the small age spread between 
the two groups. Although the author attempted to locate two 
groups of boys, aged 10 and 13. and the mean ages of the groups 
were 10.2 and 13-0 respectively, the variability in the chrono-
logical ages within the groups was larger than expected. The 
"ten" year olds' chronological ages ranged from 9.7 to 10.9 
years while the "thirteen" year olds' ages ranged from 12.6 
to I3.8 years. It may be that the failure to find differences 
in the repetition choices of the groups was, in fact, due to 
this variability in chronological ages, for the age difference 
between the oldest boy in the ten year old group and the youngest 
in the thirteen year old group was only 1.7 years. This 
difference may not have been large enough to result in changes 
in repetition choice of the interrupted task. Therefore the 
thirteen year old groups' repetition choices were similar to 
those of the ten year old groups' choices and less interrupted 
tasks were chosen by the thirteen year olds than would have 
occurred had the variability in chronological ages been smaller. 
Had the author selected two age groups which were more 
widely separated in terms of chronological age the develop-
mental tendency toward repetition choice of the interrupted 
task may have been shown. 
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A further possible reason for the failure to find a 
difference in the repetition choices of the ten and thirteen 
year old boys involves the experimental tasks. The repetition 
choice measure employed by previous researchers whose sample 
included the age levels of the present participants was one 
set of puzzles. Hence, only one repetition choice was made. 
The present author attempted to obtain a more substantial 
measure of the dependent variable by using nine sets of puzzles 
and thereby obtaining nine repetition choices. Although she 
may have succeeded and, in fact, employed a better measure, 
the participants may have made their choices poorly because 
their memory for all eighteen puzzles was not good. Thus, 
the validity of the measure may have been reduced. The 
present author's puzzles differed from those of Rosenzweig 
(1933. 1945), Bialer and Cromwell (i960), and Bialer (1961) 
not only in total number employed but also with respect to the 
number of pieces in each puzzle. In an attempt to provide 
challenging tasks, the author used twelve-piece puzzles. 
Rosenzweig's (1933, 1945) puzzles had had only five pieces 
while those of Bialer and Cromwell (i960) and Bialer (I96I) 
had had only eight pieces. Perhaps the author's puzzles, 
which were intended to be more motivating, were so difficult 
that the thirteen year olds did not choose to repeat those 
which had been interrupted, thinking that even if the 
completed puzzles seemed equally difficult, at least they had 
finished them on time. 
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Tndeed, there are several explanations for the present 
results. Only further research can help to answer the 
questions posed. 
Chronological Age, Mental Age and Recall Scores 
Past research (Sanford, 1946; Butterfield, 1965) has 
indicated that recall of the interrupted puzzle is positively 
related to both chronological and mental age. The present 
researcher has found, however, no significant difference 
between the number of interrupted tasks recalled by the 
ten and thirteen year old performers. 
On closer scrutiny, however, the apparent discrepancy 
between the present results and previous studies seems to 
disappear. °anford (1946) claimed to have found a positive 
relationship between recall scores and both chronological 
and mental age such that with increases in chronological 
and mental age recall of the interrupted task increased. 
He did not, however, report any statistical tests to assess 
the findings. The data were simply graphed. Similarly, 
Butterfield (1965) could report only nonsignificant differences 
in the hypothesized direction. The present results were in 
the same direction as those of Butterfield and Sanford. Thus, 
these findings are not inconsistent with past findings, but 
confirm them. Specifically, there does not appear to be any 
firm evidence, in consideration of the past and present 
research, to support the supposed relationship between 
recall scores (of interrupted tasks) and mental and chrono-
logical age. 
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The difference in completion times for the two age levels, 
which had been suggested as a reason for the increase in the 
number,of interrupted tasks recalled with age, was found to be 
unimportant. The covariance analysis indicated that the 
difference in the number of interrupted tasks recalled by the 
ten and thirteen year old boys remained nonsignificant when 
the covariate, time, was included. 
If the developmental tendency toward recall of the 
interrupted task were true, it is possible that the presence 
of the observer and/or the variability of chronological ages 
within the two age groups and the small spread between age 
groups may have interfered with the effect. Also, previous 
researchers (Sanford, 1946; Butterfield, 1965) had employed 
fewer puzzles. c'anford had used fifteen while Butterfield 
had presented six. V'hile the present author had used twelve-
piece puzzles Sanford's puzzles had from four to eight pieces 
while Butterfield's had six. These task variations may have 
contributed to the present results. 
Tt must be left to further research to clarify these issues. 
The Interrupted Task Paradigm and Performers vs. Observers 
While no formal hypotheses were offered, the present 
researcher expected that older observers, whose cognitive 
development was expected to be more advanced (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1969) and whose ability to understand and report 
a model's emotions was expected to be greater, would recall 
and choose to repeat significantly more interrupted tasks 
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than younger observers. The data did not support this 
expectation, perhaps because the difference in cognitive 
development of the two age groups was not sufficiently large. 
It may also be that the ability of these groupings to empathize 
did not differ significantly. (Of course it is not known 
whether the observers were attending to emotional cues or to 
the task at hand.) 
Expectations of differences between performers and 
observers received no support from either the recall or the 
repetition choice scores, for each age group. When all 
observers were compared with all performers no difference 
was found with respect to the number of interrupted tasks 
recalled. However, the data revealed a significant difference 
with respect to the number of interrupted tasks chosen for 
repetition. This difference was in the opposite direction to 
that expected. Observers chose to repeat significantly more 
interrupted tasks than did performers. 
One possible interpretation of the latter finding is 
that the observers did experience the performers' reactions 
of satisfaction when tasks were completed and the reactions 
of dissatisfaction when tasks were interrupted before 
completion. As a result, observers chose to repeat more 
interrupted puzzles than did the performers who, it has 
been suggested, failed to choose interrupted puzzles as an 
ego-defense mechanism. 
According to Lewin (1951) "the tendency to recall and 
to choose to repeat interrupted tasks are a result of the 
65 
same tension system. Observations of the observers during 
puzzle assembly indicated that most observers were attentive, 
some showing their desire to assist the performer and resorting 
to sitting on their hands, looking sporadically away to keep 
themselves from moving puzzle pieces. If then, observers 
were involved with puzzle assembly, cognitively if not 
emotionally, and did choose to repeat more interrupted puzzles 
than the performer, they would be expected to recall more 
interrupted puzzles than performers. They did not. Butter-
field's (1963) finding that repetition choice and recall 
scores are unrelated presents a possible explanation. The 
present author suggests, after Butterfield (1964) that further 
exploration of the relationship between recall and repetition 
choice criterion scores is essential. 
The finding that observers chose to repeat significantly 
more interrupted puzzles than the performers has important 
implications in every day living. 
A teaching method which is more motivating may be 
developed, should future researchers confirm the finding 
that children who observe a peer performing a task, which 
is subsequently left unfinished, choose to repeat that task 
when an opportunity is provided. The interrupted task paradigm 
could, perhaps, be employed in the teaching of gradually more 
complex tasks to observers who would, as Crandall and Rabson 
(i960) have suggested, develop more effective problem solving 
skills. 
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Further research in necessary, however, in order to 
confirm these findings and to extend them to other populations 
and to other stimulus situations. 
An initial study could be undertaken to determine if 
ten and thirteen year old female observers (whose mental 
ages are at the mean for their age group) choose to repeat 
more interrupted tasks than their female peers who perform 
the tasks. The procedure employed in the present study 
(with the exception of the recall portion) would be used 
while nine sets of puzzles would serve as the experimental 
tasks. The results of this study would show if the present 
findings hold for girls as well as boys. 
In order to study the effects of differences in the age 
and sex of the performers and observers a 2 x 2 x 2 (age x 
sex x observer - performer) experiment could be designed in 
which ten and thirteen year old males and females participate. 
The basic procedure (with the exception of the recall portion) 
and experimental tasks of the present study could be used. 
This study would indicate whether male observers choose to 
repeat more interrupted tasks than female observers. It 
would also reveal differences in the number of interrupted 
tasks chosen by observers as compared with performers with 
changes in the age and sex of both performers and observers. 
The results would be extremely useful in planning teaching 
programs such as the one which was discussed. 
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These studies could then be extended to include the 
range of ages from young childhood to adulthood. It would 
be interesting, for example, to discover if school-aged 
observers choose to repeat more interrupted tasks when 
performers are adult as compared with when they are school-
aged. This information would have important implications 
for parents when attempting to teach their children. If 
the children are motivated to finish a task which is within 
their ability level and which a parent has left unfinished, 
this technique could be used to great advantage to further 
the child's problem-solving development. 
A very useful research program concerning the effects 
of increasing the numbers of observers and performers 
present during task performance could be initiated. 
Knowledge about whether the numbers of observers present 
reduces their motivation to return to uncompleted tasks 
would be attained. In addition, information about the 
increase or decrease in observers' interest as a result 
of the numbers of performers assembling the same or 
different tasks would be gained. 
Further studies which extend the present findings 
to situations in which the mode of presentation of the 
series of tasks differs are suggested. The repetition choices 
of observers and performers when the observer watches a 
real life model (as in the present study) and when the 
observer watches a televised model could be compared. 
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Certainly the results of this study would be important 
for educators when deciding which method of presentation 
is of most benefit to the students. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Past research has indicated that with increases in 
mental and chronological age the number of interrupted 
tasks chosen for repetition and recalled increases. The 
present study was undertaken with 26 ten year old and 22 
thirteen year old boys to study these relationships. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that thirteen year old 
boys who performed the eighteen tasks (performers) would 
recall and choose to repeat more interrupted tasks than 
the ten year old boys. The results did not support these 
hypotheses. However, the data did reveal a significant 
difference with respect to the number of interrupted tasks 
chosen by the boys who observed task performance (observers) 
and performers. When the observers were considered as a 
group, they were found to choose to repeat more incompleted 
tasks than the performers. Within age groups no significant 
differences between the observers' and performers' repetition 
choices were found. 
The researcher expressed the need for further studies 
to clarify these findings and extend them to other populations 
and to other stimulus situations. She outlined an initial 
study be undertaken to determine if ten and thirteen year 
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old female observers would choose to repeat more inter-
rupted tasks than female performers. A 2 x 2 x 2 (age x 
sex x observer - performer) experiment was suggested. This 
study would reveal the effects of differences in the age, sex 
and condition (performer vs. observer) on repetition choices. 
Research in which the populations to be sampled included 
adults, and young children and in which the numbers of 
performers and observers present during task assembly varied 
were also considered. Further studies which would extend 
the present results to situations in which the mode of 
presentation of task assembly was by means of videotape 
rather than real life were also described. 
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Appendix A 
Report of Pilot Research 
Statement of Purpose 
A pilot study was conducted prior to the major study 
for several purposes: 
1. to determine the median completion times for the 
individual puzzles for the groups of grade eight 
and grade five boys and to determine the range of 
completion times over all twenty puzzles for the 
grade five and grade eight boys; 
2. to determine whether a significant difference in 
median completion times for the grade eight and 
grade five boys existed; 
3. to determine the range of median completion times 
for individual boys in grade eight and grade five; 
4. to determine if a time effect existed; 
5. to find the mean number of puzzles recalled by 
the grade five and grade eight boys; and 




Eight grade eight and nine grade five boys participated 
in the pilot study. (Three other grade five boys were not 
included as they failed to appear when scheduled.) Mental 
ages were reported to be in the range of average intelligence. 
Chronological ages for the grade five boys ranged from ten 
years five months to eleven years ten months (mean = 11 years). 
The comparable range for the grade eight boys was thirteen 
years eleven months to fifteen years four months (mean = 
13 years, 11 months). The median ages for the grade five 
and eight boys were eleven years two months and thirteen 
years ten months, respectively. 
Stimulus Materials 
Twenty twelve-piece jig-saw puzzles of birds and 
animals (drawn in black magic marker) were cut from 
7 x 9 inch (17.78 x 22.86 cm) white masonite. One 7 x 9 
inch (17.78 x 22.86 cm) white masonite board was left blank. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted on four consecutive days. 
Each boy was individually seated at a table across from 
the experimenter and was told, "I'm Laurie Davidson and 
I want to see how fast you can put some puzzles together." 
The experimenter then asked, "What is your name? age? 
birthday?" and recorded this information on the data 
sheet, (see Figure 1). She then explained: 
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Figure 1 


























Puzzle Completion Time 
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"I have a set of twenty jig-saw puzzles which you are 
to put together. All of the puzzles are this size 
(showing white masonite blank), but some of the 
pictures go this way (turning blank lengthways) and 
some go this way (turning blank sideways). I'll tell 
you which way the picture goes before you start and 
also what the picture on the puzzle is. You have only 
a certain length of time to put each puzzle together 
so try to work as quickly as possible. If you don't 
finish on time, I'll stop you. Do you have any 
questions?" 
The experimenter then asked, "What are you to do?" If the 
boys did not state (approximately) that he was going to 
assemble the puzzles as quickly as possible, the experimenter 
again explained this to him. 
All puzzles were administered in the same manner but 
in a different random order for each participant. The 
scrambled pieces of the puzzle were placed picture-side 
up in front of the child. The experimenter then said, 
"This is a picture of a (name of bird or animal) and it goes 
this way (moving the white blank). See how fast you can put 
it together. Go." Puzzle completion time was recorded with 
the stopwatch held in full view. 
When all twenty puzzles (see Table A) had been assembled, 
the experimenter asked, "Can you remember the pictures on 














































the puzzles in the order in which they were recalled. She 
then answered any questions the boy had about the research, 
asked him not to tell the other children the questions she 
had asked and thanked him for his participation. 
Results 
Median Completion Times for Individual Puzzles 
For grade eight boys the median completion times 
for the individual puzzles ranged from 72 seconds to 128 
seconds. The median of these puzzle medians was 89 seconds 
or 1.48 minutes. 
For grade five boys the median completion times for 
individual puzzles ranged from 84 seconds to 158 seconds. 
The median of these puzzle medians was 105 seconds or 
1.75 minutes. Increases of 32 and 33 seconds were shown 
for puzzles thirteen (seal) and 7 (turkey). The difference 
in median completion times between grade five and grade 
eight boys was significant when the median test (chi square 
(1) = 6.42, p_ ^  .01) was employed. 
Median Completion Times for Individual Boys 
The range in median completion times over the eight 
grade eight boys was from 78 seconds to 112 seconds. The 
range in median completion times for the nine grade five 
boys was 69 seconds to 163 seconds. 
Time Effect 
The grade eight boys showed a decrease in completion 
time over the series of puzzles. The median of the first 
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ten puzzles was 100 seconds while the median of the last 
ten puzzles was 81 seconds. The time effect for the grade 
five boys was also substantial and the scatter over the 
series presented was fairly large (from 64 seconds to 160 
seconds). The median of the first ten puzzles was 105 seconds 
while the median of the last ten puzzles was 91 seconds. 
Mean Number of Puzzles Recalled 
The mean number of puzzles recalled by the grade eight 
boys was 8.5 while the range of puzzles recalled was from 
seven to thirteen puzzles. The mean number of puzzles 
recalled by the grade five boys was 9.2 while the range of \ 
puzzles recalled by these nine boys was from seven to fifteen 
puzzles. 
Serial Position Effect 
No serial position effect was evident for the grade 
eight boys, since the frequency with which the first five 
and last five puzzles were recalled (a total of 32 times) 
did not exceed the frequency with which the second five and 
third five puzzles were recalled (a total of 36 times). An 
analysis of variance indicated that the difference in recall 
of the four sets of five puzzles was not significant. A 
serial position effect was, however, evident for the grade 
five boys when an analysis of variance was carried out. Also, 
the frequency with which the first and last five puzzles were 
recalled (44 times in total) did exceed the frequency with 
which the second and third five puzzles were recalled 
(39 times in total). 
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Discussion 
Puzzles seven (turkey) and thirteen (seal) were eliminated 
from the set of puzzles to be used in the main study because 
the grade five boys' median completion times for these 
puzzles had been 32 and 33 seconds longer, respectively, 
than the time taken for the next longest puzzle. 
Since the pilot data indicated a significant difference 
between the grade five and grade eight median completion 
times for the twenty puzzles, the author decided to perform 
covariance analyses, keeping completion time statistically 
constant, when comparing the number of interrupted puzzles 
recalled and chosen for repetition by the observers and 
performers from the two age levels. In this way the con-
tribution of differences in completion times could be 
evaluated before the recall and repetition choice scores 
were analyzed by means of 2 x 2 (age x condition) analyses 
of variance. 
Because the time effect was of some size for both age 
groups, randomization of the order of presentation of the 
puzzles was necessary. Thus, certain puzzles would not be 
recalled simply because a greater or lesser amount of time 
had been taken for their completion. 
The serial position effect was small. However, the author 
determined that pairing puzzles which appeared close to each 
other in serial order to make repetition choices would 
reduce the possibility of participants choosing completed 
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or interrupted puzzles from each pair simply because they 





Figure 1. Sample data sheet for performers 
Figure 2. Sample data sheet for observers 
Figure 3» Six experimental puzzles 
Figure 4. Six experimental puzzles 





























Random Order Puzzle Name Completed (C) Puzzle 
or Completion 


























































































duck lamb rabbit ostrich kangaroo 







































horse owl deer 






Raw Scores for 2 x 2 (age x condition) 
Analysis of Variance on Repetition Choices 
Age 
10 13 
n Repetition n Repetition 
Choices Choices 


























One boy in this group remembered all of the puzzles 
but refused to make repetition choices. 
9*» 
Table B 
Raw Scores for 2 x 2 (age x condition) 
Analysis of Variance on Recall Scores 
Age 
Condition 10 13 
n Recall n Recall 
Scores Scores 













Observers 13 3 11 3 
5 3 
4 1 
** 3 
2 2 
5 *»• 
5 3 
7 5 
4 5 
3 5 
4 4 
3 
4 
